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AGING POLICY DESIGN: BUILDING FROM 
ANNE ALSTOTT 
KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH∗ 
In her intriguing lecture, Professor Anne Alstott reminds us that legal 
scholarship enjoys a unique niche between justice and policy. Political scientists 
and philosophers evaluate justice, while legal scholars ask where and how justice 
can be achieved pragmatically. Alstott calls this our comparative advantage, the 
merging of justice and practicality. This introduction perfectly frames the work 
Alstott does in evaluating Social Security and other income and savings support 
programs for the aging and retired population, such as tax benefits given in 
support of private pensions. 
In her excellent work, Alstott invites us to refocus our policy conversations 
about the Social Security program along two dimensions. First, Alstott shows us 
that Social Security’s design was better suited to a time of lower income 
inequality, where wages were more compressed over the entire economy. 
Because Social Security penalizes recipients for taking earlier retirements (or 
incentivizes later retirements), it discriminates against those with physically 
demanding work who need to retire earlier. It does not protect contingent 
workers as well as conventional workers, failing to smooth over the regular labor 
force entry and exit which characterizes low-wage work today. It disfavors 
single parents, who are more likely to be low-wage earners. On the other hand, 
the expensive tax benefits given to private pensions are regressive, excluding 
almost all low-wage workers. Many of these rules made sense when incomes 
were more compressed, but they were not designed to perpetuate or exacerbate 
disadvantage in the way they do now. The policy design itself is aging. 
This is where Alstott makes the legal academic’s turn from practical to 
philosophical. In analyzing Social Security this way, Alstott brings to the surface 
certain commitments that inform her recommendations. What was Social 
Security supposed to achieve? What has been the consensus that held it together 
culturally and politically? How are those principles being addressed or ignored 
in debates over the solvency of the Social Security system? Is the universality of 
Social Security—that it serves all workers, not only those at the lower end of the 
income scale—a pragmatic commitment to ensure the political viability of the 
program, or is it instead a philosophical one? Some features of the program are 
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explicitly progressive. Are those a bow to the reality of income inequality, and 
are their limits a political hedge against hostility toward the program? 
Alstott shows that a program may appear just when aimed at a population with 
broadly equal circumstances. However, it becomes clear that justice is 
conditioned on underlying assumptions when the underlying circumstance of 
common economic standing disappears. Alstott expresses the point perfectly: 
“The best—and only satisfying—way to gain some purchase on policy direction 
is to grapple with the values at stake in retirement policy.” 1 Now that we have 
reached a point of income inequality that exposes questions of the purposes 
underlying the system, we need to decide whether Social Security is intended to 
enhance a robust Third Age for middle and upper middle class retirees, even 
those who are physically able to continue working, or is instead intended to 
ensure a dignified retirement by insuring against a retirement in poverty for 
anyone who, after a life of work, finds themselves threatened with that prospect. 
Alstott proposes that in addition to existing progressive benefits, we should 
consider progressive retirement ages. Under this proposal, lower income 
workers would be penalized less than higher income workers for taking earlier 
retirements. This proposal redesigns the retirement decision with an eye toward 
the challenge of income disparity and physically demanding work, without 
dismantling the system or introducing such a significant structural shift that we 
doubt our common commitments, abandon universality, or find the program 
unrecognizable. 
In responding to Alstott’s lecture, I appreciate her framework of fusing the 
insight into the legal academic’s comparative advantage at finding practical 
solutions together with her attention to the increasing inequality among the aging 
population and its implications for program design. I wonder what other areas 
of law would benefit from the same fresh investigation for practical intervention 
in light of increasing inequality among the aging population. In other words, 
where Alstott’s work focuses on income supports through Social Security, 
pension benefits, and private savings, I wonder what in-kind programs or 
background government decisions would benefit from the same second look? 
What baselines within the law have depended on a more income compressed 
population than we currently have? 
For example, what housing issues need to be examined in light of increasing 
inequality among the aging population? Housing policy can include: direct 
subsidies for senior housing; questions of zoning that might inadvertently work 
to exclude low-income aging populations from transportation-friendly areas via 
housing design that cannot adapt to the possibility of disability;2 urban planning 
that does not provide for independence among a low-income aging population; 
or zoning that does not invite the multi-generational living that enhances 
relationships, opportunities for independent living, and cost efficiency within 
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extended families.3 Transportation policy, too, might need a second look in light 
of increased income inequality among the elderly. What urban design questions 
enhance or undermine the physical health of aging populations according to their 
income, from accessibility of walkable neighborhoods to fresh and affordable 
food choices? Even workforce training and readiness policy at a much younger 
stage in the life cycle might seek to minimize the contingent relationship to the 
workforce that exacerbates income inequality during old age.4 
In other words, Alstott’s twin insights: (1) that our policy for the aging was 
designed for compressed incomes and has not adapted to income inequality, and 
(2) when we propose redesigns to policy we should combine evaluation of the 
underlying purposes and justice of the system with pragmatic design, may create 
a framework for evaluating all areas of law for their impact on, and efficacy for, 
aging people. I hope in the coming years legal scholars will bring their attention 
to questions of distributive justice for aging Americans in a variety of legal fields 
and contexts, building on Alstott’s work. 
 
3 Id. 
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